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Miller: Fourth Amendment Inquiries

FOURTH AMENDMENT INQUIRIES: WHEN OFFICERS ARE
NOT JUSTIFIED TO APPROACH A VEHICLE
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Laviscount1
(decided April 23, 2014)

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States of America has become one of the most polarized countries, as events involving suspicious circumstances seem
to be scrutinized more often. With the troubling occurrences in recent years involving police conduct, it is essential that the coverage
and dialogues over such events continue. Both the New York and
Federal courts will exclude evidence when it is obtained from an inappropriate search. Each system seeks to promote the same goal—
protecting the public from arbitrary intrusions by the police, but at the
same time encouraging good policing to defend against crime. This
is true even though each system applies a different, but similar standard when evaluating police conduct.
This Case Note will analyze situations where an officer approaches and investigates an individual who is not engaging in unlawful conduct at the time of the inquiry. More specifically, the issue
presented in People v. Laviscount was whether an officer was justified in soliciting information about an individual’s whereabouts when
parked in a remote area where a vehicle would not typically be located.2

1
2

984 N.Y.S.2d 394 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2014).
Id. at 396-97.
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FACTS

On November 7, 2008, at 2:45 a.m., Shamari Laviscount and
a female passenger were legally parked in a remote area where a vehicle would not normally be parked.3 Officer Michael Ranolde and
his partner observed them and proceeded to drive alongside the defendant’s vehicle.4 Ranolde noticed Laviscount remove an object
from his dashboard and toss it below his seat.5 Based on their intuition, the officers exited their unmarked police car and advanced towards Laviscount’s vehicle.6 While questioning Laviscount, Ranolde
witnessed him take off his gloves and throw them in the backseat.7
Subsequently, Ranolde inspected the car with his flashlight, but he
found nothing out of the ordinary.8 Both the defendant and the female passenger, after being asked to exit their vehicle, complied with
Ranolde’s request and were escorted to the back of Laviscount’s vehicle.9 Ranolde verified the defendant’s identification while his partner supervised the two potential suspects.10 After further questioning,
Ranolde flashed his light on the female passenger’s black purse and
observed what looked like the handle of a gun.11 Ranolde immediately snatched the purse and confirmed the existence of a handgun.12
Ranolde then instructed the defendant and the female passenger to
remain still, but Laviscount denied that the gun was his and fled the
scene.13
Laviscount was arrested shortly after his flight.14 The police
searched his car and recovered various suspicious items, in addition
to the gun found in the female passenger’s purse.15 Laviscount was
subsequently indicted for criminal possession of a weapon in the sec3

Id.
Id. at 396.
5
Id.
6
Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
See id. (“A subsequent search of the defendant’s car resulted in the seizure of a glove, a
ski mask, and sunglasses. In addition, the gun and a bullet were recovered from the purse.”).
4
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ond degree.16 Laviscount moved to suppress the physical evidence
found at the scene, but the Supreme Court of Queens County denied
his motion.17 At trial, a jury convicted him of the charged crime.18
The defendant appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division,
Second Department, arguing that the lower court had erred in denying his motion to suppress the material evidence recovered during the
search of his vehicle.19
III.

THE COURT’S REASONING

In reversing Laviscount’s conviction, the Appellate Division,
Second Department relied on a four-level test announced by the New
York Court of Appeals in People v. De Bour.20 This test, commonly
known as the De Bour test, established the level of inquiry that is appropriate for a police-initiated encounter and determined whether an
officer has exceeded the bounds of his or her authority.21 First, an officer has the authority to ask an individual for information only when
“supported by an objective credible reason, not necessarily indicative
of criminality.”22 Second, if the officer can provide a founded suspicion that the suspect is about to engage in criminal activity, then the
officer can conduct a more exhaustive inquiry.23 Third, a police officer is allowed to forcibly stop and confine the suspect if the officer
has a reasonable suspicion that the accused “is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit a crime.”24 Finally, the officer is
empowered to place the suspect under arrest if supported by probable
cause of criminal wrongdoing.25
When applying the De Bour test to the defendant in
Laviscount, the court concluded that the officers were not justified in
approaching the defendant’s vehicle.26 The court did not accept
16

Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 395-96; see also People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976).
21
Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 397; see People v. McIntosh, 755 N.E.2d 329, 331 (N.Y.
2001) (the first level of the De Bour test is triggered once an officer, in a police-initiated en17
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Ranolde’s rationale, finding that parking a vehicle in a remote area
during the early morning hours does not provide an objective basis to
inquire into the owner’s whereabouts.27 The court also rejected
Ranolde’s theory that his actions were warranted when the defendant
tossed an object below his seat.28 However, the court proceeded to
analyze Ranolde’s actions as if he had satisfied the first and second
levels of De Bour and still found that no reasonable suspicion of
criminal conduct had been present.29 Ranolde did not uncover any
criminal behavior when he flashed his light inside of Laviscount’s
vehicle.30 Further, there had been no evidence that established that
the defendant had committed a traffic violation, which could have
justified the inquiry.31 Thus, Ranolde and his partner were not permitted to approach the vehicle, let alone conduct an intrusive
search.32
IV.

THE FEDERAL APPROACH
A.

The Landmark Opinion: Terry v. Ohio

Eight years prior to the De Bour decision, the Supreme Court
of the United States decided Terry v. Ohio.33 Terry is considered to
be a turning point in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and forms the
basis of extensive analyses in both federal and state court opinions.
The central dispute in Terry regarded the limits placed on a police of-

gagement, requests information about the individual or his or her intentions).
27
Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 397; see People v. Miles, 918 N.Y.S.2d 594, 595 (App.
Div. 2d Dep’t 2011) (holding that the officers did not have an objective, plausible justification to advance towards the vehicle, question the defendant, and use a flashlight to examine
the vehicle, other than the fact that the vehicle was parked in an area known for narcotic and
gang related occurrences).
28
Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 396; see People v. Harrison, 443 N.E.2d 447, 477 (N.Y. 1982) (finding that “once
a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures”) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 111 n.6 (1977)).
32
Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
33
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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ficer when he or she is investigating suspicious activity.34
A jury convicted John Terry of carrying a concealed weapon,
requiring him to spend a minimum of one year in prison.35 According to the testimony of Officer Martin McFadden, around 2:30 p.m.
on October 31, 1963, Terry and his friend repeatedly looked into a
store window.36 After observing Terry and his companion, McFadden believed the men were scoping out a place to rob and worried
that they might be carrying a firearm.37 After concluding that the circumstances provided a basis for his inquiry, McFadden approached
the suspects, identified himself as a police officer and questioned
them about their identity.38 The suspects were not cooperative, and
McFadden then proceeded to take hold of Terry and searched his
clothing.39 The officer found a pistol in Terry’s coat pocket.40 Terry
was arrested, along with his friend, and both men were charged with
carrying a concealed weapon.41
The Supreme Court held that an officer is empowered to approach, question, and even conduct a limited search of a suspect
when the officer reasonably believes, based on an objective notion
and only after identifying himself, that the suspect could be armed
and presently dangerous.42 In reaching this conclusion, however, the
34

Id. at 4; see id. at 9 (referring to the more narrow issue in Terry, which was “whether in
all the circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, his right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and seizure”).
35
Id. at 4.
36
Id. at 5-6.
He saw one of the men leave the other one and walk southwest on Huron
Road, past some stores. The man paused for a moment and looked in a
store window, then walked on a short distance, turned around and
walked back toward the corner, pausing once again to look in the same
store window. He rejoined his companion at the corner, and the two
conferred briefly. Then the second man went through the same series of
motions, strolling down Huron Road, looking in the same window, walking on a short distance, turning back, peering in the store window, and
returning to confer with the first man at the corner. The two men repeated this ritual alternatively between five and six times apiece—in all,
roughly a dozen trips.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 6-7.
39
Id. at 7.
40
Id. McFadden also found a firearm on another suspect. Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 30.
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Court had to determine “whether the officer’s action was justified at
its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”43
This test was applicable when a citizen has been searched and seized,
as illustrated when McFadden took hold of Terry and explored the
exterior of his attire.44
When analyzing any justification for a police-initiated inquiry, the courts must weigh a suspect’s freedoms against any governmental interest that empowered the officer to conduct an investigation in the first place.45 An officer is warranted to approach a
suspect if the circumstances indicate “specific and articulable facts
which, taken with rational interferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant the intrusion.”46 This inquiry must be based on an objective
standard, which requires the officer to provide more than a hunch of
criminal wrongdoing.47 Assuming the officer is authorized to approach the suspect, the Court is required to evaluate the scope of the
intrusion based on the totality of the circumstances.48
The Court in Terry acknowledged McFadden’s strong interest
in self-protection, especially in a situation where officers are required
to make sudden decisions.49 However, Terry’s constitutional right to
We merely hold that where a police officer observes unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Id.
43

Id. at 20.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19. A person has been “seized” when his or her ability to leave is
restrained and such person is restricted to the confines of the immediate vicinity. Id. at 16.
45
Id. at 20-21.
46
Id. at 21.
47
Id. at 21. The appropriate standard is whether “the facts available to the officer at the
moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that
the action take was appropriate[.]” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
48
Id. at 28-29.
49
Id. at 28. “When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous . . . it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures . . .
44
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be free from an intimidating and frightening experience must not be
overlooked.50 When balancing these competing interests, the Court
concluded that McFadden’s actions did not offend Terry’s Fourth
Amendment rights.51 The officer’s objective basis that the defendants were about to engage in criminal activity was justified after witnessing their suspicious coordinated approach to potentially rob the
local store.52 In addition, McFadden did not resort to intrusive
measures when searching Terry.53 The officer’s search was limited in
scope to Terry’s outer clothing.54
B.

High Crime Areas

When analyzing police conduct, “[a]n individual’s presence in
an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to
support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is
committing a crime.”55 For example, in United States v. Beck,56 the
court held that two officers were not authorized to approach and inquire into the defendant’s whereabouts when parked in a high crime
area at 4:00 p.m.57 Officer Spears and his partner were patrolling in a
primarily African American community known for criminal activity
when they came across the defendant’s parked car.58 The defendant
and passenger, who were both African American, were seated in the
vehicle with the engine running when the officers pulled up next to
the vehicle and inquired as to their reasons for being in the neighborhood.59 The patrolmen noticed the defendant discreetly pass an item
to the passenger, and they parked their vehicle to investigate further.60 As they were parking the vehicle, Spears noticed the driver

to neutralize the threat of physical harm.” Id. at 24.
50
Id. at 24-25.
51
Terry, 392 U.S. at 31.
52
Id. at 28.
53
Id. at 30.
54
Id.
55
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
56
602 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1979).
57
Id. at 727, 729.
58
Id. at 727. Officer Spears provided evidence that he had been familiar with every person in the local neighborhood based on his extensive experience. Id.
59
Id. The officers testified that the two men were very nervous. Beck, 602 F.2d at 727.
60
Id.
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toss a “cigarette” onto the street.61 The officers exited their vehicle
and Spears observed the “cigarette” next to the defendant’s vehicle.62
Based on those observations, Spears told the men to exit the car and
forced the defendant to sit in the police vehicle.63 Spears recovered
the cigarette, which contained marijuana.64 The officers also found
two syringes, one on the street and another in plain view in the vehicle, and a bag of marijuana.65
The court of appeals found that the officers lacked an objective basis to approach the defendant’s vehicle in the first place.66 The
court acknowledged that the patrolmen had stopped and seized the
vehicle, according to Terry, when stopping next to the car and preventing the men from leaving.67 The encounter took place in a high
crime neighborhood, but “[t]here [was] nothing inherently suspicious
about two black men sitting in a parked car, with or without the engine running, on a street in a black neighborhood on a midsummer
afternoon.”68 The defendant had neither violated any traffic law nor
was there any reason to believe that the men were engaged or about
to engage in criminal conduct.69 The officers’ mere hunch could not
provide a basis to justify their actions.70 Circumstances like those in
Beck are insufficient to justify a search.
C.

Furtive Movements

The federal courts have discussed the implications of when an
individual nervously attempts to avoid an officer or conceal something from him or her.71 The Supreme Court has stated that, “nerv61

Id.
Id.
63
Id.
64
Beck, 602 F.2d at 727.
65
Id. Subsequently, the two men were placed under arrest. Id.
66
Id. at 729.
67
Id. at 728-29. The court stated that a “stop” occurs “whenever a police officer accosts
an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away.” Beck, 602 F.2d at 728 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 16).
68
Id. at 729.
69
Id. The court stated “there was no evidence of recent crimes in the neighborhood, no
reason to suspect that Beck or his passenger were wanted by the police, and no other reason
to believe anything unusual was taking place.” Id.
70
Id.
71
See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 511 F.3d 87, 89 (1st Cir. 2007) (intentionally and
nervously attempting to hide a firearm from the officers in his vehicle); United States v.
62
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ous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable
suspicion.”72 However, these movements alone do not automatically
indicate that criminal conduct is present.73
For instance, in United States v. Spinner,74 the court concluded that the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to conduct a
search based on the defendant’s nervous actions.75 The defendant’s
vehicle had been stationed in an area where parking was not permitted and officers had recently made drug related arrests.76 The officers
approached the defendant, who was fidgeting in the back seat, and
told him that he needed to move the vehicle.77 At the same time, one
of the patrolmen observed the defendant trying to hide an item in the
center console and feared that he could have a weapon.78 The defendant, at this point, acted nervously and denied that he had any
weapons on his body or in the vehicle.79 Nevertheless, after receiving
consent to frisk the defendant and finding no weapons, the officers’,
without consent, searched the vehicle on a hunch that there was a
concealed item that could potentially harm them.80 One officer “noticed that there was a small drawer at the back of the center console
all the way at the bottom which was partially open, just a small bit,
maybe a quarter of an inch” when shining his flashlight into the defendant’s vehicle.81 The officers then found a firearm in the center
console of the back seat and placed the defendant under arrest.82
Concluding that the officers’ were not justified in searching
the vehicle, the Circuit Court reasoned that the officers’ fear that the
defendant had been armed and dangerous lacked merit.83 Even
though the officers witnessed the defendant conceal an item into the
Hart, 674 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2012) (defendant bent over and cradled an object against his
waistband); United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 2013) (two men making
movements in a parked vehicle in connection with exchanging drugs).
72
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
73
Id.
74
475 F.3d 356 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
75
Id. at 360.
76
Id. at 357.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Spinner, 475 F.3d at 357.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 359-60.
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center console of the back seat, the defendant did not have any weapons on his body when he exited the vehicle and consented to be
searched.84 The fact that the defendant may have concealed an item
into the console does not create a fear that he had control of a weapon.85 The court acknowledged, in addition to the defendant’s nervous
behavior, that the officers’ search could only be justified if another
fact to support a reasonable suspicion had been present.86 The court
stated, “[w]ere nervous behavior alone enough to justify the search of
a vehicle, the distinction between a stop and a search would lose all
practical significance, as the stop would routinely—perhaps invariably—be followed by a search.”87 The officers were not warranted in
searching the defendant’s vehicle merely because he had acted nervously and made certain furtive movements.88
D.

A Reasonable Suspicion Must Be Examined Based
on the Entirety of the Circumstances

When establishing reasonable suspicion, federal courts require “that the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—
must be taken into account.”89 In United States v. DeJear,90 the court
found that the officers had a reasonable suspicion to investigate the
defendant’s car, which was parked in a private driveway.91 Officer
Morrison and three officers were patrolling in a high crime area when
they noticed the defendant and two others seated in the vehicle. 92 After parking, Morrison observed the passenger seated in the backseat
gripping a baseball bat.93 Morrison approached the vehicle, causing
the defendant to become nervous upon seeing him.94 While looking
at Morrison, the defendant stuffed “his hands—in the back part of the
front seat towards the bottom . . . in a very erratic and nervous

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Spinner, 475 F.3d at 359-60.
Id. at 359
Id.
Id. at 360.
Id.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
552 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1198, 1200-01.
Id. at 1198.
Id.
Id.
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state.”95 The officer immediately asked to see the defendant’s hands,
but the defendant would not comply.96 The officer drew his gun and
induced the defendant to finally comply with his request. 97 The officers searched the vehicle and discovered a firearm and marijuana.98
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Morrison had provided sufficient evidence to support his position that a reasonable suspicion
existed to approach and detain the defendant when looking at the circumstances as a whole.99 Morrison had approached the vehicle and
witnessed the defendant attempt to conceal something.100 Furthermore, the vehicle had been parked in a high crime area where the officer had previously observed gang members standing around.101 Finally, the passenger in the backseat had been in possession of a
baseball bat.102 When taking all these facts into account, in addition
to the defendant’s nervous state, the court found Morrison’s actions
to be justified.103
Even though the federal courts have held that the presence of
suspicious movements in a high crime area raises a reasonable suspicion, at least one recent case has indicated the opposite. In United
States v. Hill,104 the court held that the officers did not produce “specific articulable facts warranting reasonable suspicion of criminal activity” when they approached the defendant’s parked vehicle.105 The
defendant and his girlfriend were parked in front of her apartment,
which was located in a high crime area at 11:00 p.m.106 Officers
Burch and Fowler parked near the defendant’s vehicle.107 After the
two suspects noticed the police car, the girlfriend exited the vehicle
and quickly strolled to the apartment entrance.108 Fowler approached
95

DeJear, 552 F.3d at 1198 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 1200-201.
100
DeJear, 552 F.3d at 1200.
101
Id. at 1200-201.
102
Id. at 1201.
103
Id.
104
752 F.3d 1029 (5th Cir. 2014).
105
Id. at 1038.
106
Id. at 1030-031.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 1032. Officer Fowler testified that “[t]hey were sitting in a car; when we pulled
up, she gets out and moves away quickly. I’ve seen it happen before in situations like this,
96
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the vehicle and requested to speak with the defendant.109 The defendant opened the driver’s side door, and Fowler immediately asked,
“[w]here’s your gun?”110 The defendant denied the existence of a
firearm and could not produce a driver’s license.111 The defendant
exited his vehicle at the officer’s request, and Fowler proceeded to
search him for weapons.112 The officer found a gun and placed him
under arrest.113
The court held that the encounter that took place in the high
crime area and the girlfriend’s nervous movements did not give rise
to a plausible justification for the officers’ actions.114 The officers
could not point to specific criminal activity where the encounter took
place, but could only acknowledge that there had recently been homicides in the county.115 Furthermore, the fact that the confrontation
took place at a late hour on a Saturday night was not significant because “[n]o reasonable officer who happens upon a couple sitting in a
car in an apartment complex parking lot on a weekend night would,
without more, suspect criminal activity.”116 The girlfriend’s quick
exit and approach to the apartment did not give rise to a reasonable
suspicion.117 The officers only witnessed the suspects in the vehicle
for a few seconds before she egressed.118 Because the officers had no
reason to suspect criminal activity when they approached the complex, her exit could have been for a multitude of reasons.119 Based on
the circumstances presented before the court, the officers lacked a
reasonable suspicion.120

and we have encountered narcotics in situations like that before.” Hill, 752 F.3d at 1032 (internal quotations omitted).
109
Id. at 1032.
110
Id. (internal quotation ommitted).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Hill, 752 F.3d at 1032.
114
Id. at 1037-38.
115
Id. at 1035.
116
Id. at 1036.
117
Id.
118
Hill, 752 F.3d at 1037.
119
Id. at 1037. The court stated, “she could have exited the car out of a desire to flee from
the police; or, she could have simply exited the car because Hill drove her home, they finished saying their ‘goodbyes,’ and she was preparing to go inside.” Id.
120
Id. at 1038.
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THE NEW YORK STATE APPROACH
A.

People v. De Bour

In New York, every citizen has the “right to be left alone.”121
When an officer has an objective basis in concluding that the circumstances are ripe to take action, the subsequent events will be subjected to the proper safeguards.122 This limitation is prescribed in People
v. De Bour.123 The central issue in this case was whether a law enforcement agent patrolling on a public street can legally confront a
citizen, without a material indication that the individual has engaged
in criminal activity, in an effort to request information.124 Officer
Kenneth Steck and his partner were patrolling on foot in Brooklyn,
where they witnessed Louis De Bour walking down the street at
12:15 a.m.125 When the officers were within forty feet of De Bour, he
strangely crossed the street.126 The officers followed De Bour, approached him and inquired into his reasons for being in the neighborhood.127 After the defendant nervously answered the question, Steck
requested identification, which the defendant could not produce.128
Subsequently, Steck observed a protuberance near the bottom of De
Bour’s jacket.129 The officer demanded that De Bour open up his
jacket, and the defendant complied.130 Steck discovered a loaded revolver and placed De Bour under arrest.131
Before the New York Court of Appeals, De Bour argued that
he had been “seized” under the Fourth Amendment when the officers
approached him and restricted his right to leave.132 Invoking People
121

De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 569.
See id. at 575.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 565.
125
Id.
126
De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 565.
127
Id.
128
Id. De Bour told the officers that he was on his way to his friend’s home and had recently parked his vehicle. Id.
129
Id.
130
De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 565.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 566. De Bour contended “that he was deprived of his freedom of movement by
the obvious show of authority and the equally obvious display of force by virtue of his being
122
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v. Cantor,133 a Court of Appeals case decided one year earlier, De
Bour contended that the officers’ actions amounted to an unconstitutional seizure because they had no “founded suspicion predicated on
specific articulable facts that criminal activity [was] afoot.”134 The
prosecution, also relying on Cantor, asserted that the officers’ actions
were justified because De Bour had crossed the street in an area
known for narcotics transactions in order to evade the police. 135 The
Court of Appeals stated that the appropriate test for measuring the
reasonableness of a search or seizure under Cantor “requires a weighing of the government’s interest against the encroachment involved
with respect to an individual’s right to privacy and personal security.”136 When balancing these competing interests, a court must determine whether the officer was justified in initiating the inquiry, and
whether the scope of the measures was proportionate to the circumstances.137 The court explained that an officer is justified to investigate into criminal activity only if there is a founded suspicion that the
suspect is engaging in criminal conduct.138 Furthermore, an officer
cannot validate his actions “by a subsequently acquired suspicion resulting from the stop.”139
The court in De Bour held that the officers did not violate the
defendant’s constitutional rights because the inquiry had been justified from its inception and was appropriate in scope.140 The court
further concluded that De Bour had not been “seized” as defined in
Cantor.141 Steck and his partner were permitted to approach the defendant for the purpose of identification because the detention had
been brief, aimed at preventing a potential narcotics transaction, and
did not place the defendant in a frightening or humiliating position.142
outnumbered by armed officers.” Id.
133
324 N.E.2d 872, 876 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that the defendant had been “seized” when
three officers surrounded him and restricted his ability to leave).
134
De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 566.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 566.
140
Id. at 571.
141
Id. at 567 (“[Defining] a seizure of the person for constitutional purposes to be a significant interruption with an individual’s liberty of movement.”) (citing Cantor, 324 N.E.2d at
876).
142
Id. at 570.
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De Bour had suspiciously crossed the street after midnight in an area
commonly known for drug activity to avoid any interaction with the
officers.143 Additionally, Steck did not exceed his authority when
asking De Bour to display what was inside of his jacket.144 The officer believed the bulge to be a firearm, and this contention was in
fact reasonable when taking into account the events as a whole.145
Steck did not conduct an overly intrusive search, but rather asked the
defendant to unzip his jacket and did not grab him until noticing the
firearm.146 Therefore, the search was not excessive in scope.147
More critical than the adjudication itself, De Bour provided a
long lasting standard; reformed and expanded from Cantor.148 This
four-level police inquiry standard provides:
The minimal intrusion of approaching to request information is permissible when there is some objective
credible reason for that interference not necessarily
indicative of criminality. The next degree, the common-law right to inquire, is activated by founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and permits a
somewhat greater intrusion in that a policeman is entitled to interfere with a citizen to the extent necessary
to gain explanatory information, but short of a forcible
seizure. Where a police officer entertains a reasonable
suspicion that a particular person has committed, is
committing or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor, the CPL authorizes a forcible stop and detention of that person. A corollary of the statutory right
to temporarily detain for questioning is the authority to
frisk if the officer reasonably suspects that he is in
danger of physical injury by virtue of the detainee being armed. Finally a police officer may arrest and take
into custody a person when he has probable cause to
believe that person has committed a crime, or offense

143
144
145
146
147
148

Id.
De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 570.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 571.
Id.
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in his presence.149
The court noted that this should be seen as a step-by-step analysis,
and officers must only act on an objective notion when confronting a
citizen in public.150 Additionally, this test “directly correlates the degree of objective credible belief with the permissible scope of interference.”151 This inquiry, which is still the standard in New York,
has been applied to countless situations.
B.

An Objective Credible Reason Is Mandated when
Approaching a Vehicle

The New York courts have decided numerous cases where an
officer unjustifiably approaches a vehicle.152 These cases are analyzed on the facts and circumstances of each specific encounter. For
example, in People v. Spencer,153 the court held that officers were not
justified in pulling the defendant over pursuant to a report of an assault that occurred the day before.154 The officers, who were accompanied by the complainant, patrolled the community looking for her
boyfriend.155 After driving with the officers for about five minutes,
the complainant identified the defendant seated in a parked vehicle.156
The defendant was her boyfriend’s friend who may have had
knowledge of the suspect’s whereabouts.157 As the defendant began
to drive away, the officers turned on the police vehicle’s lights and

149

De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 571.
Id. at 572.
151
Id.
152
See People v. Ocasio, 652 N.E.2d 907, 908 (N.Y. 1995) (finding that officers were justified to approach the defendant’s vehicle when doing so on foot and not forcibly detaining
the defendant by using the police vehicle’s sirens); People v. Brown, 492 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626
(App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1985) (holding that undercover officers in a high-crime neighborhood
violated the defendant’s rights when approaching the defendant’s vehicle after witnessing a
conversation between the defendant and a woman; the woman entered the car, and the defendant “made a series of sharp lurching movements backwards and forwards”); People v.
Thomas, 792 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473-74 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005) (holding that an officer is
authorized to approach and investigate the driver of a vehicle parked in front of a fire hydrant because only a licensed driver can be legally parked next to the still object).
153
646 N.E.2d 785 (N.Y. 1995).
154
Id. at 786, 790.
155
Id. 786.
156
Id. at 786-87.
157
Id.
150
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pulled the defendant over.158 The officers walked up to the vehicle
and inspected the car’s interior with their flashlights.159 The officers
noticed a translucent bag containing marijuana below the female passenger’s seat.160 The defendant and the female passenger exited the
car at the request of the officers, and a subsequent search of the vehicle revealed a loaded firearm, in addition to the marijuana.161
The court found that the officers’ initial decision to approach
the defendant’s vehicle was not supported by a specific, articulable
basis.162 The court made a critical distinction between the standards
placed on an officer when forcibly stopping a vehicle and inquiring
into a pedestrian’s whereabouts.163 This distinction is important due
to the fact that he had been parked and began to drive away when the
inquiry first occurred.164 The court stated:
Although the right to stop a vehicle is generally analogous to the right to stop a pedestrian, police/motorist
encounters must be distinguished from police/pedestrian encounters when the police are operating on less than reasonable suspicion. This is because
“the obvious impact of stopping the progress of an automobile is more intrusive than the minimal intrusion
involved in stopping a pedestrian” and constitutes “at
least a limited seizure subject to constitutional limitations,” whereas the common-law right of inquiry—
much less the right to request information—does not
include the right to unlawfully seize.165
For constitutional purposes, a vehicle is effectively seized when an
officer pulls the vehicle over.166 Furthermore, the court reasoned that
the officers were not justified in stopping the vehicle simply because
the defendant could have knowledge of where the suspect might be,

158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Spencer, 646 N.E.2d at 787.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 790.
Spencer, 646 N.E.2d at 787.
Id. at 786-87.
Id. at 787 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
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especially when less invasive measures could be used.167 The officers did not inquire into the defendant’s whereabouts before the complainant identified him; but the officers could have gone to the defendant’s home if they believed he had any knowledge of where the
suspect could be.168 The inquiry occurred almost two days after the
assault had been reported.169 Lastly, the defendant had not been approached because he was suspected of committing the assault, but rather to potentially provide information about the suspect’s location.170
Taking all of those considerations into account, the officers’ actions
were not justified.171
When an officer acts solely on a hunch of criminal wrongdoing, the New York courts have held that the encounter is unjust from
its inception.172 In People v. Sobotker,173 the court held that the defendant had been unlawfully seized under the Fourth Amendment
when the officers pulled the defendant’s vehicle over because they
“felt that a crime was about to be committed.”174 The two officers
were parked in an illuminated area where multiple burglaries had recently taken place.175 The plain clothed patrolmen witnessed the defendant’s vehicle approach an intersection and oddly slow down near
a local bar.176 Similar to the first instance, the men looked over at
another bar when at the stop sign.177 Based on those events, the officers decided to forcibly pull the vehicle over.178 After the defendant
could not supply appropriate documents for the vehicle or identification, the officers searched the men.179 The officer’s found five bullets
167

Id. at 790.
Spencer, 646 N.E.2d at 789.
169
Id. at 789.
170
Id. at 790.
171
Id.
172
See People v. Howard, 542 N.Y.S.2d 536, 540 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1989) (stating that
the defendant’s presence in a “robbery prone” area can be considered when justifying a
hunch, but standing alone does not justify the assertion). The court held that the officers had
no objective reason to approach the defendant who had been standing on the street corner.
Id.
173
373 N.E.2d 1218 (N.Y. 1978).
174
Id. at 1220 (internal quotations omitted).
175
Id. at 1219.
176
Id. There had been a stop sign at the corner of the intersection; the vehicle’s speed diminished to around five miles per hour, and the men looked briefly towards the local bar. Id.
177
Sobotker, 373 N.E.2d at 1219.
178
Id.
179
Id.
168
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on one of the passengers and a firearm in the vehicle.180
The Court of Appeals, in finding that the officers’ hunch did
not support any confirmation of wrongdoing, stated, “the seemingly
innocuous act of the defendant and his companions in glancing at a
bar, even if it could be argued that they were then driving through a
‘high crime neighborhood,’ did not reasonably denote criminal conduct.”181 When the men glanced at the second bar, they were properly stopped at a stop sign.182 The court did recognize, however, that if
the officers had been patient and waited for the events to unfold, then
they might have lawfully uncovered criminal activity. 183 The fact
that the officers acted, rather than waited, did not justify the finding
that at least one of the men was armed because if “hindsight alone
[were] to furnish the governing criteria, a vital constitutional safeguard of our personal security would soon be gone.”184
C.

Reasonable Suspicion of Criminality

Much like the federal courts, the Court of Appeals has examined cases for the purpose of determining whether or not an officer
had a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct to justify an inquiry.185 It has been established that “[r]reasonable suspicion is the
quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent cautious man under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at
hand.”186 For instance, in People v. May,187 the court held that the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to suspect any criminal
conduct.188 The defendant and female passenger were sitting in the
defendant’s car, which was parked on an abandoned street in a high
180

Id. at 1219-220.
Id. at 1220-221.
182
Sobotker, 372 N.E.2d at 1221.
183
Id. The court noted “the premature juncture at which the police did in fact act in this
instance, they had come upon no fruit ready for harvesting.” Id.
184
Id.
185
See Harrison, 443 N.E.2d at 452 (holding that the officers’ lacked a reasonable suspicion because the defendant’s rental car had been dirty); People v. Heston, 543 N.Y.S.2d 803,
804 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1989) (finding a reasonable suspicion when an “officer then observed a rolled dollar bill in plain view on the floor of the vehicle. He testified that his experience informed him that rolled bills were used to ingest cocaine.”).
186
Cantor, 324 N.E.2d at 877.
187
609 N.E.2d 113 (N.Y. 1992).
188
Id. at 115.
181
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crime area.189 At around 2:30 a.m., two officers drove behind the defendant’s vehicle and proceeded to turn the vehicle’s turret lights
on.190 As the defendant began to drive away, the officers commanded
through the vehicle’s loudspeaker that the defendant pull over.191 After the defendant complied, the officers requested identification and
questioned the defendant.192 Subsequently, the officers learned, after
running the license plate, that the car had been stolen and arrested the
defendant.193 A subsequent search revealed a finding of crack cocaine.194
In deciding to suppress the evidence, the Court of Appeals
found that the officers had “seized” the defendant when “using red
turret lights, a spotlight and a loudspeaker, [and] ordered the defendant to pull the car over . . . .”195 Because a seizure had occurred, the
only way for the stop to be acceptable was if a reasonable suspicion
existed.196 The court determined that the officers had no reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, other than the fact that the inquiry occurred on an abandoned street and in an area commonly known for
criminal activity.197 The defendant’s conduct did not rise to the level
of reasonable suspicion because the defendant was entitled “to be let
alone” when he drove away from the officers.198
VI.

TWO DIFFERENT, BUT SIMILAR STANDARDS

Both the Terry and De Bour approaches have substantially
evolved over the last 50 years. In particular, the analysis of parked
vehicles has provided the necessary safeguards for each and every
citizen to live freely without arbitrary police intrusions.199 These pro189

Id. at 114.
Id.
191
Id.
192
May, 609 N.E.2d at 114.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id. at 114-15.
197
May, 609 N.E.2d at 114-15.
198
Id. at 115. (internal quotations omitted).
199
See, e.g., United States v. See, 574 F.3d 309, 311 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that the officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to approach the defendant’s parked vehicle located in a
high crime area at 4:30 A.M.); People v. Morrison, 555 N.Y.S.2d 183, 184-85 (App. Div. 2d
Dep’t 1990) (stating that defendant’s parked vehicle with the motor on in a neighborhood
190
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tections were proven strong in Laviscount when the Appellate Division, Second Department vacated the defendant’s conviction.200 No
evidence had been presented to the effect that Laviscount had been
doing anything unlawful when seated in his parked car at a late hour;
yet the officer arbitrarily decided to approach the defendant’s vehicle
based on nothing more than his gut feeling that criminal activity was
occurring.201 A car simply parked in a strange area is nothing more
than that, a parked car in a strange area. However, when other factors
are presented, as such were in DeJear, an officer could be justified to
approach a suspect’s vehicle.202
Had Laviscount’s case been brought in federal court, the outcome might have been different. Rather than the inflexible and gradual approach established in De Bour, the Terry analysis might have
provided a sufficient basis to convict Laviscount and uphold a conviction.203 A federal court, looking at the circumstances as a whole,
could have accepted the argument that a car parked at a late hour in a
remote area with the driver engaging in skeptical movements provided reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. The federal approach
does not hinge on a step-by-step analysis. Rather than stopping the
analysis at the initial approach as the court properly did in
Laviscount, a federal court might have taken into account the defendant’s actions when Ranolde pulled alongside Laviscount’s vehicle.204
The gradual New York approach did not take into consideration any
of the defendant’s actions after Ranolde pulled up next to the vehicle.205 If his furtive movements were taken into account, the prosecutor could have had a stronger argument to convict Laviscount and
uphold the verdict.206
VII.

CONCLUSION

Police officers are scrutinized, after the fact, about the decisions they make or choose not to make. The courts are in place to
known for crime did not provide a reasonable suspicion to conduct a search and seizure).
200
See Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
201
Id.
202
See DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196.
203
See Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 396-97.
204
Id. at 396; see Terry, 392 U.S. 1; De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562.
205
Laviscount, 984 N.Y.S.2d at 396-97.
206
See id. at 397.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015

21

Touro Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 4 [2015], Art. 8

790

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 31

retrospectively evaluate their conduct and determine whether they
exceeded the bounds of their authority. However, each encounter
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Officers are involved in
situations where they must act quickly, but that does not exempt them
from abiding by the appropriate safeguards. Nevertheless, police officer safety and judgment must be given its appropriate weight in
these inquires due to the nature of their duty. In sum, the courts must
continue to strike an appropriate balance between freedom and safety
in order for citizens to feel comfortable when a police-initiated encounter occurs.
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